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Democracy Incongruence and Protest
Jungmoo Woo* & Jaechul Lee1
The literature on protest argues that economic grievances against the government increase the 
likelihood of a protest. However, the literature offers little explanation for why some states with good 
economic performance, such as South Korea and China in the 1980s, experienced severe protests. 
This study suggests that even though a state has a high income level, if its political institutions do not 
satisfy citizens’ demands for democracy caused by economic development, citizens would have political 
grievances against their government. If citizens share such political grievances, their civil society 
would have the group-level perception of discrepancy between their demand for democracy and their 
government’s institutional supply of political rights, called democracy incongruence. As the level of 
democracy incongruence in a state increases, the citizens are willing to participate in protest to express 
political grievances against the government. Empirical results support this argument.
Keywords: democracy incongruence, economic development, civil liberties, protests.
IntroductIon
Poor economic performance generally reduces economic opportunities for employment 
and entrepreneurship as well as the ability of the state to provide public goods and finance 
social programs, and, thus, raises the citizens’ economic grievances against the government. 
Prior studies have argued that the economic grievances against the government are likely to 
encourage citizens to mobilize and participate in protests to express the grievances (Bell et 
al., 2013; Besley and Persson, 2009; Campante and Chor, 2012; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 
2015; smith, 2004). However, this argument fails to explain why, for example, south 
Korea, China, and Turkmenistan have shown different protest trends. In the 1980s, south 
Korean government showed good economic performance. south Korean annual economic 
growth rates were around 8 percent on average from 1982 to 1986, and south Korean gross 
domestic product (gDP) per capita in 1986 was 7073.15 dollar (gleditsch, 2002). However, 
south Korea experienced severe protests in 1987 (Banks, 2010). In the 1980s, Chinese 
government also showed good economic performance. Chinese annual economic growth 
rates were around 7 percent on average from 1981 to 1988 (gleditsch, 2002). nevertheless, 
China experienced severe protests in the late 1980s, including the Tiananmen square 
protests in 1989. Because many citizens in south Korea and China in 1980s demanded the 
higher level of political rights than the level of political rights that their political institutions 
provided, they mobilized and participated in protests. In contrast to south Korea and China, 
Turkmenistan has shown bad economic performance. Turkmenistan’s gDP per capita hardly 
increased from 1993 to 2006, and Turkmenistan even experienced severe economic crises 
in 1994, 1995, and 2006 (gleditsch, 2002). However, Turkmenistan has not experienced 
protests yet. these contrasting cases indicate that if we focus only on the effect of poor 
economic performance on the likelihood of protest, we may not fully understand why some 
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states with good economic performance have experienced protests while other states with bad 
economic performance have rarely experienced protests.
To explain these cases, this study suggests the concept of democracy incongruence. 
Democracy incongruence is defined as the group-level perception of discrepancy between 
their government’s institutional supply of political rights and their demand for democracy 
caused by economic development. Prior studies have shown that as a state’s income level 
increases, citizens are more likely to demand democracy (Boix and stokes, 2003; Inglehart 
and Welzel, 2005; lipset, 1959). economic development makes citizens wish to protect 
and improve their quality of life and individual autonomy, prompting them to seek a higher 
level of political rights and civil liberties to achieve them (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). That 
is, economic development encourages citizens to demand democratic institutions that can 
provide better political rights and civil liberties. However, if a state’s political institutions fail 
to meet citizens’ demands for democracy brought about by economic development, citizens 
would have political grievances against their government. If citizens share such political 
grievances, their civil society would perceive that there was a democracy incongruence. The 
study argues that an increase in democracy incongruence increases citizens’ willingness to 
participate in protest and, thus, the likelihood of a protest.
However, prior studies on protests have focused primarily on the impact of either 
economic or political factors on the likelihood of protest. For example, some studies have 
argued that because poor economic conditions reduce citizens’ quality of life with fewer 
opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship and with a decrease in the government’s 
ability to finance social programs, poor economic conditions increases the willingness 
to participate in protest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015; Richards and gelleny 2006). 
Other studies have argued that when social discrimination against a minority group are led 
particularly by the government, members of the minority group are willing to participate in 
a protest (Bell et al., 2013). These studies have rarely explained the impact of interactions 
between economic and political factors on protests. the main argument of this study may 
shed light on how interactions between economic and political factors affect the likelihood of 
protest.
This study is organized into four sections. In the first section, a brief review of the 
literature on protest reveals that the likelihood of a protest relies both on willingness to 
participate in a protest and ability to mobilize a protest. In the second section, this study 
explains democracy incongruence, and then how democracy incongruence increases the 
likelihood of a protest by increasing citizens’ willingness to participate in a protest. This 
study also argues that the effect of democracy incongruence on the likelihood of a protest 
depends upon the level of civil liberties that provide the ability to mobilize a protest. The 
third section examines the effect of democracy incongruence on the likelihood of a protest. In 
the final section, this study discusses the implications of the empirical results.
DeTeRMInanTs OF PROTesTs: WIllIngness TO PaRTICIPaTe In a PROTesT 
anD aBIlITy TO MOBIlIZe a PROTesT
Prior studies have defined a protest as a set of coordinated social and political methods 
used by domestic non-governmental actors, who try to disrupt and challenge any government 
actors, policies, or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature 
(Bell et al, 2013; Butcher and svensson, 2016; Carey, 2006; Chenoweth and stephan, 2011; 
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Cunningham, 2013). Protest entails social and political methods beyond conventional or 
institutional politics, such as voting, interest groups, or lobbying (Chenoweth and stephan, 
2011). Costs of participation in protest are generally higher than costs of the participation 
in conventional politics (Cunningham, 2013). This is because mobilizing a protest requires 
convincing individuals to abandon their daily activities, and participants in a protest should 
be willing to bear the potential risks of reprisal from the state. However, participation 
in conventional politics rarely makes the government utilize extreme measures against 
citizens, because conventional politics already exists and operates within the rules of the 
game (Cunningham, 2013). Because participation in protest is costlier than participation in 
conventional politics, only if citizens anticipate that they are unlikely to achieve their goals 
with conventional politics but are able to successfully mount a protest, they would mobilize 
and participate in a protest. This implies that there are two types of protest determinants: the 
willingness to participate in a protest and the ability to mobilize a protest.
First, citizens are willing to participate in a protest when they have grievances against the 
government — including political elites, policies, or authority — that are not easily resolved 
by conventional politics (Cunningham, 2013). Prior studies have argued that the increase 
in citizens’ willingness to participate in a protest increases the likelihood of a protest, and 
have suggested three factors that affect the willingness to participate in a protest. The first 
factor is poor economic conditions, including low income level, low economic growth, and 
poverty. generally, poor economic conditions reduce citizens’ quality of life, because of 
fewer opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship and a decrease in the government’s 
ability to finance social programs. The low quality of life caused by poor economic conditions 
encourages citizens to consider stronger options to express their economic grievances against 
the government than conventional politics, and, thus, increases the willingness to participate 
in protest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015; Richards and gelleny 2006). The second factor is 
social discrimination against different social, ethnic, religious, or gender categories, referred 
to as horizontal inequality (Cederman et al., 2011). generally, horizontal inequality entails 
blocked or limited access to central decision-making authority within the state, the uneven 
distribution of wealth among groups, uneven social access including education and societal 
status, and inequalities with respect to cultural policies and symbols including national 
holidays and religious rights (stewart 2008). If discrimination policies against a minority 
group are led particularly by the government, members of the minority group will anticipate 
that social discrimination against them cannot be resolved by conventional politics and, 
thus, be willing to participate in a protest to express their political grievances against the 
government (Bell et al., 2013). The last factor is state repression, including extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, and torture. State repression encourages citizens to anticipate 
that their human rights can be violated by the government and, thus, to consider mutual 
protection from future violation of their human rights (Bell et al., 2013). That is, state 
repression makes citizens dubious that conventional politics can protect their human rights 
and, thus, willing to participate in a protest to prevent future violation of their human rights 
(Ritter, 2014).
second, citizens’ ability to mobilize a protest also affects the likelihood of a protest. 
generally, citizens are less willing to participate in a protest, because citizens have to 
abandon their daily activities and bear the potential risk of reprisal from the government (Barry 
et al., 2014). Due to the high costs to participate in a protest, citizens are willing to enjoy 
benefits from a successful protest without participation in the protest, a collective action 
problem (Olson, 1965). This implies that mobilizing a protest requires lowering costs to 
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participate in a protest. Costs to participate in a protest can be reduced by human, financial, 
and informational resources that allow citizens to share their grievances with other citizens 
and to coordinate collective actions (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015). as more citizens 
share their grievances with other citizens and have better ability to coordinate collective 
actions, citizens are more likely to expect that many citizens will participate in a protest. The 
expectation encourages more citizens to participate in a protest, because the increase in the 
size of a protest reduces costs to participate in a protest by reducing the risk of reprisal from 
the government and by increasing the perceived probability of the protest’s success (lichbach, 
1995). That is, more resources to communicate citizens’ grievances against the government 
to other citizens and more resources to coordinate collective actions reduce anticipated costs 
to participate in a protest and, thus, improve citizens’ ability to mobilize a protest. 
Prior studies have suggested several important resources to share grievances against the 
government with other citizens and to coordinate collective actions. For example, Bell and 
his colleagues argued that electronic communication, including the ratio of mobile phone 
subscribers and internet users, provides more opportunities to share grievances against the 
government and coordinate locations, tactics, and responses when citizens mobilize a protest 
(Bell et al., 2013). Butcher and svensson (2016) and Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) argued 
that interactions in social networks established by urbanization and industrialization allow 
citizens to more easily communicate their social grievances against the government to other 
citizens and to coordinate collective actions. Carey (2006) argued that a successful past 
protest also reduces costs to mobilize a new protest. This is because the past protest provides 
citizens with opportunities to share social grievances against the government with other 
citizens, including both participants and nonparticipants in the past protest. the information 
about coordinating the past protest also facilitates coordination of a new protest, thereby 
encouraging more people to participate in the new protest. In the following part, this study 
suggests that the incongruence between income level and the level of democracy is likely to 
cause citizens’ political grievances against the government. If citizens share their perception 
of discrepancy between the government’s institutional supply of political rights and their 
demand for democracy caused by economic development at the group level, they would have 
a higher level of willingness to mobilize and participate in a protest.
eCOnOMIC DevelOPMenT, DeMOCRaCy, anD PROTesT
as stated above, prior studies have argued that poor economic performance increases 
citizens’ economic grievances against the government and, thus, their willingness to 
participate in a protest (Richards and gellany, 2006). However, this study argues that 
economic development may also cause citizens’ demand for democracy, and thus may 
perceive the incongruence between the government’s institutional supply of political rights 
and citizens’ demand for democracy caused by economic development that increases their 
willingness to mobilize and participate in a protest. economic development causes three 
kinds of social and cultural changes, referred to as modernization: (1) the decrease in material 
constraints that compel people to focus only on their survival, (2) the increase in the level 
of education and the accessibility of intellectual and informational resources, and (3) social 
networks generated by urbanization and industrialization that diversify human interactions 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). These social and cultural changes accompanied by economic 
development allow people to focus not only on economic issues to survive but also on social 
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and political issues to guarantee the quality of life and individual autonomy (Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2005).
to guarantee better quality of life, people are increasingly concerned with their political 
rights (free and fair elections, political pluralism and participation, and constitutional 
separation of powers) and civil liberties (freedom of expression and freedom of association 
and assembly) (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Political rights and civil liberties protect 
citizens from the government’s potential violation of individual autonomy and from its 
attempts to hinder citizens’ active political participation and more elite-challenging political 
attitudes (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Thus, modernization encourages citizens to demand 
democracy, which provides citizens with political rights and civil liberties to protect the 
quality of life and individual autonomy. However, political elite are generally willing to 
avoid democracy to more stably retain power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). This is 
because when political elites retain power, they can access rents to pursue their interests and 
can achieve desired policy outcomes. nevertheless, democracy provides citizens with regular 
chances to replace political leaders (Dahl, 1973). Thus, although economic development 
encourages citizens to demand democracy, which provides political rights and civil liberties, 
the government might not supply democratic institutions to citizens because political elites 
are willing to avoid democracy to more stably retain power. If a state’s political institutions 
do not satisfy citizens’ demand for democracy derived from economic development, people 
will begin to see the relative deprivation between their expectation for political rights and 
their government’s institutional supply of political rights (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). That 
is, as the incongruence between a state’s institutional supply of democracy and citizens’ 
demand for democracy derived from economic development increases, the citizens are 
more likely to perceive relative deprivation in regard to their political rights. Thus, despite 
stable and acceptable economic performance, if a state’s political institutions do not satisfy 
citizens’ demand for political rights and civil liberties, citizens will have the higher level 
of the willingness to mobilize and participate in a protest. This study defines such relative 
deprivation caused by the incongruence between a state’s institutional supply of democracy 
and citizens’ demand for democracy as “democracy incongruence.” The main expectation 
of this study is that the increase in democracy incongruence increases citizens’ willingness 
to participate in a protest to express democracy incongruence and, thus, the likelihood of a 
protest.
To more specifically explain the effect of democracy incongruence on the likelihood of 
a protest, this study illustrates two contrasting scenarios in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the line “y 
= x” indicates the level of democracy that citizens demand from the government at a given 
level of economic development. The node “state a” indicates that political institutions in 
state a provide a higher level of political rights and civil liberties than citizens’ demand 
for democracy. However, the node “state B” indicates that political institutions in state 
B provide the lower level of political rights and civil liberties than citizens’ demand for 
democracy. This implies that although state B shows a higher level of economic development 
and a higher level of democracy than state a, citizens in state B are more likely to perceive 
democracy incongruence and, thus, a higher level of the willingness to participate in a protest 
than citizens in state a. This is because political institutions in state B less satisfy citizens’ 
demand for democracy than political institutions in state a. Thus, state B is more likely to 
experience a protest than state a.
For example, Papua new guinea and Kyrgyzstan have shown a lower level of gDP 
per capita and lower level of democracy than ecuador. However, Papua new guinea and 
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Kyrgyzstan have experienced few protests, while ecuador has experienced numerous 
protests. The ecuadorian government enjoyed economic growth rates with larger public 
spending in the 2000s. However, the 2000 ecuadorian coup reduced the level of democracy, 
and thus failed to satisfy public demand for democracy. This decrease in ecuadorian level 
of democracy made ecuador consistently experience anti-government protests in the 2000s. 
However, Papua new guinea has experienced few protests, because Papua new guinea’s 
poor economic performance has compelled citizens to focus on their survival rather than 
the quality of life and/or human autonomy. Kyrgyzstan also experienced few protests in 
the 1990s, because Kyrgyzstan’ economic crisis after the collapse of soviet Union did not 
provide chances for citizens to demand the quality of life and/or human autonomy instead of 
their survival. These cases reveal that even if a state enjoys stable and acceptable economic 
performance, if the state’s political institutions do not satisfy citizens’ demand for democracy 
derived from economic development, citizens would democracy incongruence. The 
increase in democracy incongruence is likely to lead citizens to participate in a protest. this 
expectation yields the following hypothesis:
H1: As a state’s democracy incongruence increases, the state’s likelihood of a protest 
increases.
However, prior studies have argued that the likelihood of a protest depends not only 
upon willingness to participate but also upon ability to mobilize a protest. that is, if citizens 
do not have the sufficient ability to mobilize a protest, their willingness to participate in a 
protest would not increase the likelihood of a protest. Thus, to more specifically analyze the 
impact of democracy incongruence on the likelihood of a protest, we should consider how 
democracy incongruence interacts with factors that can affect ability to mobilize a protest. 
This study focuses on the interaction between democracy incongruence and civil liberties. 
Civil liberties include freedom of expression and freedom of association and assembly. 
an increase in the level of civil liberties provides citizens with more opportunities to share 
grievances with other citizens and to coordinate collective actions (Bell et al., 2013). That 
is, an increase in the level of civil liberties reduces costs to participate in a protest, and thus, 
improves citizens’ ability to mobilize a protest. Thus, if a state supplies a sufficient level of 
Figure 1. The Relationship between economic Development and the level of Democracy and 
democracy Incongruence
The level of 
democracy
Economic democracy
State A
state B
y = x
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civil liberties, citizens who feel democracy incongruence will likely mount a protest because 
they have sufficient ability to mobilize a protest. 
However, even if many citizens feel democracy incongruence, if their state does not 
supply a sufficient level of civil liberties, citizens cannot easily mount a protest. This is 
because citizens would have fewer opportunities to communicate their grievances with 
each other and a low level of ability to coordinate locations, tactics, and responses to 
mobilize a protest, and, thus, would face high costs to participate in a protest. this implies 
that as a state’s level of civil liberties increases, the effect of democracy incongruence on 
the likelihood of a protest increases. This is because a higher level of civil liberties allows 
more citizens who feel democracy incongruence to mobilize and participate in a protest by 
improving citizens’ ability to communicate their grievances with each other and to coordinate 
locations, tactics, and responses to mobilize a protest.
In order to more specifically explain the interaction between democracy incongruence 
and civil liberties, this study illustrates two contrasting scenarios in Figure 2. In Figure 2, the 
line “y = x” indicates the level of democracy that citizens demand from the government at a 
given level of economic development. Both the “state a” and the “state B” nodes indicate 
that political institutions provide a lower level of political rights and civil liberties than 
citizens’ demand for democracy. In addition, the level of the incongruence between state 
a’s democracy and citizens’ demand for democracy is same as the level of the incongruence 
between state B’s. This is because the distance between the node “state a” and the level 
of democracy on the line “y = x” at state a’s level of economic development is the same as 
the distance between the node “state B” and the level of democracy on the line “y = x” at 
state a’s level of economic development. This implies that citizens in state a and citizens in 
state B have the same level of democracy incongruence. If we assume that state B’s level of 
democracy indicates that citizens in state B have a higher level of civil liberties than citizens 
in state a, we should expect that the effect of democracy incongruence on the likelihood 
of a protest in state B is higher than that in state a. This is because state B’s level of civil 
liberties indicates that citizens in state B have a better ability to mobilize a protest than 
citizens in state a and, thus, that citizens in state B can more easily mount a protest when 
they have the willingness to participate in a protest than citizens in state a. This expectation 
leads to the following hypothesis:
Figure 2. Democracy Incongruence and the level of Civil liberties
The level of 
democracy
Economic democracy
State A
state B
y = x
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H2: As a state’s level of civil liberties increases, the effect of democracy incongruence on 
the likelihood of protest increases.
to more precisely analyze the second hypothesis, this study focuses on the difference 
between violent protests and nonviolent protests. Chenoweth and stephan argued that citizens 
face a lower level of barriers to collective actions when they try to mobilize and participate 
in nonviolent campaigns (e.g., protest, boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, stay-aways, and other acts of 
civil disobedience) than when they try to mobilize and participate in violent campaigns (e.g., 
revolutions, coups d’état, and insurgencies) (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015). specifically, 
nonviolent campaigns have a lower level of physical, informational, and moral barriers to 
mobilization and participation than violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015). First, 
joining a violent campaign is likely to require physical capabilities to use violent actions, 
such as strength, agility, youth, and endurance. However, joining a nonviolent campaign 
does not require such physical capabilities. That is, while participation in a violent campaign 
is likely to be physically prohibitive, female or elderly citizens who may be reluctant to 
join such campaign, may participate in a nonviolent campaign. second, although citizens 
should communicate their grievances to each other and should coordinate their responses 
to their regime to mobilize collective actions, movement activists are less likely to share 
the information to mobilize a violent campaign with other citizens. This is because the high 
risks associated with violent activities mean that mobilizing a violent campaign must remain 
underground. However, because nonviolent campaigns rely less on underground activities 
and sometimes even have a festival-like atmosphere with concerts, singing, and/or street 
theater, citizens may share information about mobilizing a nonviolent campaign more easily 
than a violent campaign. Third, many citizens are less willing to commit violent acts due 
to moral barriers. That is, even if a citizen has grievances against the citizen’s state, if the 
citizen is reluctant to translate the grievances into violence, the citizen would not participate 
in a violent campaign. However, because participants in a nonviolent campaign do not use 
violence, participation does not require willingness to overcome moral barriers to using 
violence. Thus, citizens can more easily decide to participate in a nonviolent campaign than 
in a violent campaign.
although Chenoweth and stephan (2011) focused on the difference between participation 
in nonviolent campaigns and participation in violent campaigns, their argument provides 
a hint that citizens are more likely to face barriers when they mobilize and/or participate 
in a violent protest than when they mobilize and/or participate in a nonviolent protest. 
First, participation in a violent protest includes using tools of violence, such as Molotov 
cocktails and sticks, and, thus, is likely to provoke violent state repression. This implies 
that participation in a violent protest requires physical capabilities to use tools of violence 
and to endure violent state repression. Therefore, a violent protest is physically prohibitive. 
second, in order to secretly prepare tools of violence, movement activists should conceal 
their plan to mobilize a violent protest from other citizens, because preparing tools of 
violence to mobilize and participate in a protest is illegal. Thus, many citizens might not 
know the information about mobilizing a violent protest. However, mobilizing a nonviolent 
protest does not have to remain underground, as it does not require tools of violence. 
Consequently, informational barriers to participation in a violent protest are higher than those 
to participation in a nonviolent protest. Third, although violent activities in a violent protest 
are less violent than violent activities in a violent campaign, the use of violence in a violent 
protest also encourages participants to feel reluctance to translate their grievances into 
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violence. However, participation in a nonviolent protest rarely causes moral burdens. These 
three kinds of barriers to participation in a violent protest imply that citizens need a higher 
level of the ability to mobilize a protest to overcome costs of mobilizing and participating 
than a nonviolent one. Because civil liberties improve citizens’ ability to mobilize a protest, 
citizens who feel that democracy incongruence exists, need a higher level of civil liberties 
when they try to mobilize and participate in a violent protest than when they try to mobilize 
and participate in a nonviolent protest. This causal relation is tested to examine the second 
hypothesis.
ReseaRCH DesIgn
This study provides two testable hypotheses. First, the increase in the level of democracy 
incongruence increases the likelihood of a protest. Second, the effect of democracy 
incongruence on the likelihood of a protest depends upon the state’s level of civil liberties. 
The unit of analysis in this study is country-year for all states from 1982 to 2007. This study 
examines the likelihood of a protest using the Cross-national Time-series archive dataset, 
which defines a protest as a peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary 
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government actors, policies, or authority 
(Banks, 2010). However, nonviolent protests do not include demonstrations of a distinctly 
anti-foreign nature. The dataset also defines a violent protest as any violent demonstration or 
clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force. This study refers to the 
measure of nonviolent protests as Nonviolent Protest and the measure of violent protests as 
Riot. Both variables are event-count variables coded the number of each state’s nonviolent 
or violent protests in a given year. This study also refers to the sum of Nonviolent Protest 
and Riot as Protest. Protest is the dependent variable of empirical models for H1 and H2. To 
more precisely test the second hypothesis, this study focuses on how civil liberties differently 
affect the effect of democracy incongruence on the likelihood of nonviolent protest and on 
the likelihood of violent protest. To analyze the difference, this study employs Nonviolent 
Protest and Riot as the dependent variables of empirical models for additional analysis of H2. 
The dataset covers 168 states, which results in 4,336 country-year observations. To test the 
hypotheses, this study employs the fixed effects negative binomial regression model instead 
of Poisson regression models due to the overdispersion of Protest, Nonviolent Protest, and 
Riot and the likelihood of positive contagion. This study uses the fixed effects models instead 
of the random effects models, because this study does not assume that the dependent and 
independent variables are uncorrelated with states’ unobserved heterogeneity. all independent 
variables are lagged one year to avoid endogeneity problems.
Democracy incongruence
This study assumes that, as a state’s income level increases, citizens in the state are 
more likely to be concerned with the quality of life and individual autonomy and, thus, are 
more likely to demand democracy that provides political rights and civil liberties to protect 
citizens’ quality of life and individual autonomy. However, if the state’s political institutions 
do not satisfy citizens’ demand for democracy, citizens would perceive of democracy 
incongruence.
To measure the level of a state’s democracy incongruence, this study first regresses 
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Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index (Freedom House, 2016) on the natural log of 
gDP per capita using gleditsch’s dataset (gleditsch, 2002) that is lagged one year to avoid 
any endogeneity problem. The Freedom in the World Index measures each state’s level 
of democracy based on two categories (the level of political rights and the level of civil 
liberties) with a thirteen-point scale. The residuals from the predicted values in the regression 
model indicate the difference between a state’s predicted level of democracy based on the 
state’s gDP per capita and the state’s level of democracy, and, thus, indicate the level of the 
state’s democracy incongruence. The residuals are a continuous variable. The minimum value 
of the residuals is -4.081, and the maximum value is 5.547. The mean of the residuals is zero, 
and the median of the residuals is 0.373. Because the higher number of the Freedom in the 
World Index indicates the lower level of liberal democracy, the higher value of the residuals 
indicates that citizens feel a higher level of democracy incongruence. This study employs 
the residuals as the independent variable, and refers to it as Democracy Incongruence. the 
summary statistics of Democracy Incongruence are reported in table 1.
to test H2, this study measures civil liberties using Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World Index (Freedom House 2016). The Freedom in the World Index measures the level 
of civil liberties with various questions about freedom of expression and belief, freedom 
of association and assembly, the rule of law, and personal autonomy in each state, using a 
seven-point scale in which a higher value indicates a lower level of civil liberties. This study 
inverts this to a new seven-point scale in which a higher value indicates a higher level of civil 
liberties. This study refers to the civil liberty variable as Civil Liberty.
Control variables
numerous control variables are included to assure that the factors identified in Table 2 
are isolated from other measures that might influence the dependent variables. First, prior 
studies have argued that state repression is less likely to follow protests in democracies 
than in other regime types (Carey, 2006). This implies that citizens in democracies are 
likely to face a lower level of costs to mobilize and participate in a protest due to the lower 
likelihood of state repression. To control this possibility, this study uses the Polity 2 score 
in the Polity Iv dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2019), and refers to it as Polity.1 next, prior 
studies have argued that larger populations present more opportunities for antigovernment 
1 This study uses the Polity 2 score in the Polity Iv data set to control the effect of democratic 
institutions on the likelihood of a protest. This is because prior studies have argued that the 
likelihood of a protest depends on whether a state has political institutions that accommodate popular 
discontent and opposition and the Polity 2 score measures the extent to which political institutions 
are accountable to the public. However, the Freedom in the World Index focuses not only on political 
institutions but also on political culture, including civil liberties. Thus, this study uses the Freedom 
in the World Index to measure Democracy Incongruence, but does not use the Freedom in the World 
Index as a control variable to control the effect of political institutions on the likelihood of a protest.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of Democracy Incongruence
Mean Standarddeviation Minimum Maximum Q1 Median Q3
0 1.784 -4.081 5.547 -1.423 -0.373 1.403
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actions (Chenoweth and lewis, 2013; Hegre and sambanis, 2006). Thus, this study controls 
for each state’s logged population size to account for the different sizes of states using 
gleditsch’s dataset (gleditsch, 2002), and refers to it as Population (log). the third set of 
control variables is two variables to capture the effect of economic grievances against the 
government on the likelihood of a protest: GDP/capita and Economic Growth. Prior studies 
have also argued that poor economic conditions are likely to cause citizens’ economic 
grievances against the government that increase the willingness to participate in a protest 
and, thus, the likelihood of a protest (Richards and gelleny, 2006). GDP/capita measures the 
natural log of gDP per capita, and Economic Growth measures the percentage change in gDP 
per capita from year to year, using gleditsch’s dataset (gleditsch, 2002). This study expects 
that the high levels of GDP/capita and Economic Growth indicate the low levels of economic 
grievances against the government and, thus, reduce the likelihood of a protest. The last set 
of control variables is meant to control the reciprocal relationship between protests and state 
repression that prior studies have suggested (Ritter, 2014). Prior studies have argued that as 
the level of state repression increases, citizens become more likely to participate in a protest 
(Carey, 2006), similar to the tit-for-tat strategy (axelrod, 1985). Thus, this study employs 
Repressiont-1, using the Cingranelli–Richards (CIRI) human rights dataset (Cingranelli et 
al., 2014). This variable indicates each state’s level of state repression, including torture, 
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance, and ranges from 0 to 8, 
with higher values indicating the lower level of repression. Prior studies have also suggested 
that protest movements tend to maintain themselves because more people are likely to join 
if a critical mass of protesters is achieved and encourages other people to feel protesters’ 
commitment and willingness to dissent (Davenport, 2007). Thus, this study includes the 
number of each state’s protests in the prior year, referring to it as Protestt-1.
rESuLtS
This study begins by examining the effect of Democracy Incongruence on three 
dependent variables, Protest, Nonviolent Protest, and Riot, in table 2. All models can be 
interpreted similarly, with positive coefficients indicating that a protest becomes more likely 
as the independent variable increases. In Table 2, the dependent variable in Models 1 and 4 
is Protest, the dependent variable in Models 2 and 5 is Nonviolent Protest, and the dependent 
variable in Models 3 and 6 is Riot. each model in Table 2 includes the independent variable, 
Democracy Incongruence, to examine hypotheses, and control variables to assure that 
the factors identified in table 2 are isolated from other measures that might influence the 
dependent variables.
The positive and statistically significant coefficients of Democracy Incongruence 
(p<.05) in Models 1 and 2 provide initial support for the general expectation for the effect of 
Democracy Incongruence on the likelihood of a protest. that is, empirical results in Models 
1 and 2 support the idea that the increase in the level of democracy incongruence increases 
citizens’ willingness to participate in a protest and, thus, increases the likelihood of a protest. 
an increase in a state’s democracy incongruence particularly increases the likelihood of a 
nonviolent protest. However, the coefficient of Democracy Incongruence in Model 3 reveals 
that democracy incongruence does not significantly affect the likelihood of a violent protest. 
That is, because a violent protest has higher barriers to mobilization and participation than a 
nonviolent protest, even if citizens feel democracy incongruence and have the willingness to 
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participate in a violent protest, citizens would not easily decide to mobilize and/or participate 
in a violent protest.
In substantive terms, the effect of Democracy Incongruence on the likelihood of a protest 
is considerable. In Model 1, the coefficient of Democracy Incongruence indicates that the 
likelihood of a protest increases by around 31 percent if a state experiences a one-unit 
increase in Democracy Incongruence. In addition, in Model 2, the coefficient of Democracy 
Incongruence also indicates that the likelihood of a nonviolent protest increases by around 
54 percent if a state experiences a one–unit increase in Democracy Incongruence. this 
reveals that democracy incongruence significantly increases the likelihood of a protest and, 
Table 2. The effect of Democracy Incongruence on Protest, 1982–2007
Model 1
(H1)
Protest
Model 2
(H1)
Nonviolent 
Protest
Model 3
(H1)
Riot
Model 4
(H2)
Protest
Model 5
(H2)
Nonviolent 
Protest
Model 6
(H2)
Riot
Democracy 
Incongruence
1-(0.270)*** 1-(0.432)*** 1-(0.139)*** 1-(0.199)+** 1-(0.016)*** 1-(0.356)***
-1(0.080)*** -1(0.097)*** -1(0.121)*** -1(0.114)*** -1(0.125)*** -1(0.157)***
Civil Rights 1-(0.263)*** 1-(0.349)*** 1-(0.145)*** 1-(0.214)*** 1-(0.304)*** 1-(0.090)***
-1(0.082)*** -1(0.089)*** -1(0.112)*** -1(0.081)*** -1(0.088)*** -1(0.110)***
Dem. Incong. 1-(0.114)*** 1-(0.109)*** 1-(0.124)***
× Civil Rights -1(0.018)*** -1(0.020)*** -1(0.026)***
Polity 1-(0.038)*** 1-(0.058)*** 1-(0.012)*** 1-(0.029)*** 1-(0.048)*** 1-(0.005)***
-1(0.011)*** -1(0.012)*** -1(0.015)*** -1(0.011)*** -1(0.012)*** -1(0.014)***
Population 1-(0.183)*** 1-(0.129)*** 1-(0.126)*** 1-(0.191)*** 1-(0.139)*** 1-(0.142)***
(log) -1(0.033)*** -1(0.038)*** -1(0.049)*** -1(0.033)*** -1(0.038)*** -1(0.049)***
GDP/capita 1-(0.197)*** 1-(0.314)*** 1-(0.215)+** 1-(0.085)*** 1-(0.210)*** 1-(0.092)***
(log) -1(0.087)*** -1(0.096)*** -1(0.120)*** -1(0.087)*** -1(0.097)*** -1(0.121)***
Economic 1-(1.172)*** 1-(1.072)*** 1-(1.566)*** 1-(1.115)*** 1-(1.019)*** 1-(1.485)***
Growth -1(0.365)*** -1(0.399)*** -1(0.481)*** -1(0.367)*** -1(0.402)*** -1(0.486)***
Protestt-1 1-(0.066)*** 1-(0.065)***
-1(0.004)*** -1(0.004)***
Nonviolent 1-(0.108)*** 1-(0.103)***
Protestt-1 -1(0.008)*** -1(0.008)***
Riott-1 1-(0.116)*** 1-(0.120)***
-1(0.009)*** -1(0.010)***
Repressiont-1
1-(0.047)*** 1-(0.037)+** 1-(0.045)+** 1-(0.038)+** 1-(0.030)*** 1-(0.033)***
-1(0.020)*** -1(0.022)*** -1(0.027)*** -1(0.020)*** -1(0.022)*** -1(0.027)***
Constant 1-(2.442)*** 1-(1.307)*** 1-(1.378)*** 1-(3.006)*** 1-(1.846)*** 1-(2.122)***
-1(0.559)*** -1(0.640)*** -1(0.868)*** -1(0.565)*** -1(0.647)*** -1(0.878)***
N 4045 3970 3615 4045 3970 3615
NStates 150 146 133 150 146 133
Wald chi2 -406.69)*** 1280.87)*** -218.07)*** -429.97)*** -304.06)*** -227.33)***
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed).
a Cell entries report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from fixed-effects negative binomial regressions.
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particularly, the likelihood of a nonviolent protest.
Regarding the control variables, we see that results are generally consistent with previous 
studies. The effects of two variables capturing economic performance, GDP/capita (log) 
and Economic Growth, on the likelihood of a protest are statistically significant. In Model 
1, the coefficient of GDP/capita (log) indicates that the likelihood of a protest decreases 
by around 18 percent if a state’s gDP per capita increases by 1 percent. In Model 1, the 
coefficient of Economic Growth also indicates that the likelihood of a protest decreases 
by around 0.79 percent if a state experiences 1 percent increase in Economic Growth. 
The negative and statistically significant coefficients of GDP/capita (log) and Economic 
Growth in Models 2 and 3 also reveal that better economic performance decreases both the 
likelihood of a nonviolent protest and the likelihood of a violent protest. These empirical 
results support prior studies’ arguments that because states with better economic performance 
enjoy greater administrative capacity, which can deter dissidents, and have more options 
for redressing citizens’ grievances against the government, those states are less likely to 
experience a protest. The effect of the larger population size on the likelihood of a protest is 
also statistically significant. In Model 1, the coefficient of Population (log) indicates that the 
likelihood of a protest increases by around 13 percent if a state’s population size increases by 
1 percent. The positive and statistically significant coefficients of Population (log) in Models 
2 and 3 also reveal that the larger population size increases both the likelihood of a nonviolent 
protest and the likelihood of a violent protest. These empirical results support prior studies’ 
arguments that a larger population size presents more opportunities for antigovernment 
action. In Models 1–3, each state’s protests, nonviolent protests, and riots in the prior year, 
Protestt-1, Nonviolent Protestt-1 and, Riott-1, also significantly affect the likelihood of a protest, 
the likelihood of a nonviolent protest, and the likelihood of a violent protest. These results 
support prior studies arguments that protest movements tend to maintain themselves because 
more people are likely to join if a critical mass of protesters is achieved, which encourages 
other people to feel protesters’ commitment and willingness to dissent. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficients of Repressiont-1 in Models 1–3 reveal that when we 
control for the effect of civil liberties on protest, the higher level of repression is likely to 
reduce the likelihood of a protest because state repression increases participation costs. 
Finally, the coefficients of Polity in Models 1 and 2 are positive and statistically significant. It 
seems that as a state’s level of democracy increases, citizens should expect that their protest 
will affect their state’s policy decision-making processes and they will less likely experience 
state repression. Thus, the increase in the level of democracy increases the likelihood of a 
protest.
In Table 2, Models 4–6 test H2. Results in Model 4 in Table 2 support the second 
hypothesis that the effect of a state’s democracy incongruence on the likelihood of a protest 
depends upon the state’s level of civil liberties. The interaction effect between Democracy 
Incongruence and Civil Liberty in Model 4 in Table 2 is graphically presented in Figure 
3, showing that as a state’s level of civil liberties increases, the effect of democracy 
incongruence on the likelihood of a protest increases. That is, as a state’s level of civil 
liberties increases, citizens who feel democracy incongruence will be more likely to stage 
a protest because their ability to share grievances with other citizens and to coordinate 
collective actions becomes better. specifically, in states with a Civil Liberty score of “four” 
or higher, such as guatemala, nigeria, and nepal, the increase in the level of civil liberties 
increases the effect of democracy incongruence on the likelihood of a protest. These results 
imply that even if citizens feel democracy incongruence, only if they have the sufficient 
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level of civil liberties to share their grievances with other citizens and coordinate collective 
actions, the increase in democracy incongruence will increase the likelihood of a protest.
Results in Models 5 and 6 in Table 2 reveal that citizens who feel democracy 
incongruence need a higher level of civil liberties when they mobilize and participate in 
a violent protest than when they mobilize and participate in a nonviolent protest. This 
is because barriers to mobilizing and participating in a violent protest are higher than 
barriers to mobilizing and participating in a nonviolent protest. The interaction between 
Democracy Incongruence and Civil Liberty in Models 5 and 6 in Table 2 are graphically 
presented in Figure 4. Figure 4 reveal that only if a state has a Civil Liberty score of at least 
“five,” such as Mexico and India, the state’s citizens who feel democracy incongruence 
may mount a violent protest. However, citizens may mount a nonviolent protest to express 
democracy incongruence if their regime has a Civil Liberty score of at least “three,” such 
as Russia, algeria, and Oman. Finally, Wald’s chi-squared statistics of all models in Table 
2 are significant at <.001, and indicate a fair/good model fit. This implies that Democracy 
Incongruence should be considered to predict the likelihood of a protest.
concLuSIon
This study explores how citizens perceive relative deprivation despite the government’s 
good economic performance and how such deprivation affects the willingness to participate 
in a protest and thus the likelihood of a protest with the concept of democracy incongruence. 
The theory and the empirical results of this study suggest three implications. First, as a state’s 
income level increases, citizens demand the higher level of democracy that provides political 
rights and civil liberties to guarantee the quality of life and individual autonomy. However, 
because political elites desire to stay in power without the provision of political institutions 
to protect citizens’ political rights and civil liberties that might increase the risk of the loss of 
power, a state’s political institutions may not satisfy citizens’ demand for democracy derived 
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Figure 3. Conditional Marginal effects of Democracy Incongruence on Protest with 95 percent 
Confidence Intervals, 1982–2007
note:  The graph reports the conditional marginal effect of Democracy Incongruence on the likelihood 
of a protest in Model 4 in Table 2.
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from economic development. This situation may encourage citizens to perceive relative 
deprivation, called democracy incongruence, and may increase the likelihood of a protest.
Second, the effect of democracy incongruence on the likelihood of a protest depends 
on the state’s level of civil liberties. To participate in a protest, citizens must bear costs of 
abandoning daily activities and the potential risks of reprisal from the state. Thus, even if 
many citizens have the willingness to participate in a protest, if they lack sufficient ability to 
mobilize a protest, they cannot stage a protest. However, the increase in a state’s level of civil 
liberties reduces costs to mobilize and participate in a protest, and, thus, improves citizens’ 
ability to mobilize a protest. This is because civil liberties allow citizens to share their 
grievances with other citizens and coordinate collective actions. Thus, as a state’s level of 
civil liberties increases, the effect of democracy incongruence on the likelihood of a protest 
should increase.
Third, citizens who feel democracy incongruence require a higher level of civil liberties 
when they mobilize and participate in a violent protest than in a nonviolent protest. This is 
because barriers to participation in a violent protest are higher than barriers to participation 
in a nonviolent protest. Thus, citizens who desire to express their grievances against the 
government in a violent protest need a better ability to overcome the higher barriers to 
mobilize and participate. Because the increase in a state’s level of civil liberties provides 
citizens with a better ability to overcome barriers to mobilize and participate in a protest, 
violent protests require a higher level of civil liberties than nonviolent protests. Thus, to 
more specifically explain the likelihood of a protest, we should distinguish protests between 
nonviolent and violent protests.
In summary, the theory and the empirical results of this study suggest an implication for 
future research. This study argues the interaction between a state’s income level, an economic 
factor, and its level of democracy, a political factor, causes democracy incongruence and 
thus increases citizens’ willingness to participate in protest. This argument and the empirical 
results also imply that because citizens’ willingness to participate in protest is affected not 
only by economic and political factors themselves but also by interactions between economic 
and political factors, future research on protest should consider those interactions to more 
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Figure 4. Conditional Marginal effects of Democracy Incongruence on nonviolent Protest and Riot 
with 95 percent Confidence Intervals, 1982–2007
note:  The graph reports the conditional marginal effects of Democracy Incongruence on the likelihood 
of a nonviolent protest and the likelihood of a violent protest in Models 5 and 6 in Table 2.
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specifically explain the onset of protest.
This study provides an implication for policy and future research. The main argument 
of this study reveals that economic factors and political factors interact with each other and 
citizens consider the interaction when they evaluate their government. This argument implies 
that when scholars analyze protests or other political instability phenomena, they should 
consider the impact of the interaction between economic factors and political factors as well 
as independent impact of each factor. Additionally, only if political leaders consider the 
interaction between economic factors and political factors, they would find out what citizens 
perceive and what they argue.
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